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fendant's "last known residence" could result in personal jurisdiction
over him. 40 However, various factors tend to indicate that it
was the intent of the legislature, in enacting CPLR 308, to limit
the mailing of process within the state, unless there was some substantive basis for acquiring in personam jurisdiction over the
non-domiciliary defendant. 1 One such factor is that the predecessor
sections to CPLR,308(3) indicated clearly that the mailing must
be within the state.42 In addition, since the legislative notes and
reports on the CPLR make no mention of an out-of-state mailing,4 3
it would appear that the legislature was making no
attempt to
44
change the established law as found under the CPA.
CPLR 308(3) is a mere device to effectuate service when such
service under 308(1) cannot be made with due diligence. The
nature of CPLR 308(1) indicates an underlying basis for in
personam jurisdiction (physical presence within the state). To say
that service of process under 308(3) can in and of itself be
utilized as a basis for acquiring in personamn jurisdiction where
the defendant is not physically present, but merely has a place of
business within the state, without the cause of action arising from
such business, would be "stretching the constitutional requirements
of due process to its [sic] outermost limits." 45 It might even exceed
those bounds.
CPLR 308(3): Claim interposedfor purpose of statute of limitations
when summons served pursuant to statute-not when filed.
In Browning v. Nix, 46 plaintiff delivered the summons to the
Sheriff of Erie County thereby effecting a sixty-day extension of the
statute of limitations, as provided by CPLR 203(b) (4). Thereafter, plaintiff utilized substituted service pursuant to CPLR 308(3).
However, plaintiff did not file proof of the substituted service, as
required by CPLR 308(3), until such time that both the statute of
limitations and the CPLR 203(b) (4) sixty-day extension had
expired. Therefore, the defendant argued that even though substituted service was effected during the sixty-day extension, since
40

See, e.g, Timen v. Robinson, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
April 6, 1964, p. 15, col. 1; 7B McKnxNEY's CPLR 308, supp. commentary

77 (1965).

Cf. CPLR 313-16; CCA §§ 404-08.
See CPA § 230.
45 See SECOND REP. 156; FnTHm REP. 266.
44 "It is a sound inference that in the absence of express language indicating
its intention, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to overturn
long standing rules of law." McKINNEY's SrTtrTsS § 74.
45
Durgom v. Durgom, supra note 38, at 516, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
46 47 Misc. 2d 709, 263 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965).
41
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the proof of service was not filed until after this extension,
47 the
statute of limitations had barred the plaintiff's cause of action.
The court, in ruling against the defendant's contention, had to
interpret the meaning of CPLR 308(3) in light of CPLR 203
which is the statutory provision dealing with the running of the
statute of limitations. CPLR 203 (a) computes the time in which an
action must be commenced from the time the cause of action
accrues to the time the claim is interposed. A claim, according to
CPLR 203(b) (1) is interposed when the summons is served upon
the defendant. The court was of the opinion "that the 'completion'
of service by filing proof of service does not and was not
intended to determine the date of the interposing of the claim." 4s
The court further stated that "commencement, not completion, of
service is the threshold of interposure of a claim where service
other than delivery to the defendant in person is used." 49
The requirement of filing proof of service was added in order
to follow past practice, and apparently there is no time limitation
placed upon an effective filing.50 The actual purpose of this clause
is to add ten days to a defendant's time to answer when substituted
service is utilized.51 Thus, the fact that filing occurs after the
statute of limitations expires should not give defendant a valid
defense.
This conclusion is reinforced when CPLR 203(b)(2) and
CPLR 316(c) are read together. CPLR 203(b) (2), which concerns service by publication, provides that a claim is interposed
"when first publication of the summons . . . is made," and CPLR
316(c) provides that "service by publication is complete on the
,
twenty-eighth day after the first day of publication."
One authority has argued that since this filing provision exists
merely for the purpose of adding to the time in which the dethis provision would have been better placed
fendant must answer,
52
in CPLR 3012(c).
Vehicle & Traffic Law §254: Applies for reasonable time after
defendant returns to the state after more than thirty-day absence.
5 3
Gallagher v. Price,
adds clarification to Sections 253 and 254
of the Vehicle & Traffic Law, sections frequently used by the
4 CPLR 308(3) provides that when service is effected pursuant to that
section the service is complete ten days after the filing of proof of service in the

county
clerk's office.
48
Browning v. Nix, 47 Misc. 2d 709, 710, 263 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (Sup. Ct.
Erie45 County 1965).
Id. at 711, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44.
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